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Modern agriculture is reliant on agricultural machinery for the production of food,
fuel, and other agricultural products. The need for producing large quantities of quality
agricultural products while sustainably stewarding environmental resources has led to the
integration of numerous digital technologies into modern agricultural machinery, such as
the CAN bus and telematic control units (Liu et al., 2021). An unintended drawback of
these integrated digital technologies is the opportunity for these components to become
cyberattack vectors. Cyberattack instances have increasingly targeted critical
infrastructures, with numerous reports from agencies such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) warning of the
significance of cyberattacks targeting the agricultural infrastructure specifically
(Boghossian et al., 2018; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2021; Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2022). Agricultural machinery, which is included in the agricultural
infrastructure, has the potential to be targeted by cyberattacks, although the impacts are
not well quantified or understood. This project demonstrates a hypothetical case study,
where cyberattacks targeting in-season side-dress nitrogen application to corn could
cause as much as $100 or more in profit loss per acre. Literature discussing practical
cybersecurity solutions for agricultural machinery from both industry and academic
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institutions is absent, therefore two possible solutions were demonstrated in this project:
modeling and the use of security testbeds. A four-step modeling methodology was
developed and investigated as a solution in identifying the most security-critical areas of
a machine. Two specific cyberattack scenarios were modeled to demonstrate the
potential of the modeling methodology. A Security Testbed for Agricultural Vehicles
and Environments (STAVE) was also developed as a useful solution for the identification
of cybersecurity vulnerabilities to agricultural machinery (Freyhof et al., 2022). A replay
attack and wireless signal recordings were performed to evaluate various components on
STAVE.
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1.

1

Background and Motivation
Modern agricultural equipment has been an essential component during the transition

from small acre subsistence farming to agriculture as we know it today (Liu et al., 2021).
As a result, today’s modern agricultural production system is heavily dependent on
agricultural machinery such as tractors and combine harvesters to efficiently produce
large amounts of food, fuel, and other agricultural products. Recent increases in
production and efficiency can largely be attributed to improved agronomic practices and
precision agricultural techniques, enabled by the integration of digital and networking
technologies into modern equipment (Freyhof et al., 2022). These technologies have
allowed farmers to transition to the ‘next era’ of data-driven agriculture that is heavily
dependent on precision agricultural practices.
According to the International Society of Precision Agriculture (ISPA), precision
agriculture is a general area of agricultural management that utilizes “temporal, spatial
and individual data” to make informed management decisions to improve “efficiency,
productivity, quality, profitability and sustainability of agricultural production”
(“Precision Ag Definition,” n.d.). The continued advancements of modern technologies
such as autonomy, will further the implementation of precision agricultural practices
(Boubin et al., 2019). For example, John Deere recently released a tractor (Model: 8R)
that will operate autonomously without an operator (Tibken, 2022). The introduction of
autonomous technologies and equipment will continue to accelerate the implementation
of precision agricultural practices by allowing more data to be collected and reducing

barriers to farmers such as labor shortages (Rahmadian and Widyartono, 2020).
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However, the increased integration of digital and autonomous technologies has created
many vulnerabilities within modern agricultural equipment (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2022; Nikander et al., 2020; Sparrow and Howard, 2021).
In the past few years, a number of cyberattacks (Federal Bureau of Investigation,
2021; McVan and Midwest, 2021) have targeted farms and other agricultural
infrastructure. For example, in January 2021, a ransomware attack targeting a US farm
caused around $9 million in financial losses (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2021),
while a major meatpacking company was reported to have paid $11 million in ransom to
cybercriminals in another ransomware attack (McVan and Midwest, 2021). Multiple
recent reports have warned that agricultural machinery could be the next targets for
cyberattacks since agricultural production is so heavily reliant on them (Baker and Green,
2020; Boghossian et al., 2018).
This results in the question: what is being done to protect agricultural equipment, and
consequentially, agricultural production systems from further cyberattacks? For the
purposes of this research, the cybersecurity of agricultural machinery is defined as the
process of ensuring that agricultural machinery will be available and secure to safely
perform tasks as intended, without allowing critical data, for example yield or planting
data collected during farming operations, to be accessed by unauthorized parties.
Cybersecurity of agricultural machinery would protect against events such as
ransomware, denial of service, or unsafe equipment manipulation.
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In the broader agricultural community, cybersecurity research has examined solutions
to areas such as IoT devices and communication networks (Demestichas et al., 2020;
Ferrag et al., 2022). Other literature sources have emphasized the importance of
cybersecurity to agriculture and agricultural machinery (Boghossian et al., 2018; “Risks
of using AI to grow our food are substantial and must not be ignored, warn researchers,”
2022) but provide little to no practical implementation or solutions. Cybersecurity
research in the automotive industry (“Automotive Cybersecurity by Design,” 2021;
Burkacky et al., 2020; Yu and Luo, 2020) supports the need to include cybersecurity
practices during the entire lifecycle of the vehicle or machine, including the design
process. These findings are directly applicable to agricultural machinery since modern
automotive and agricultural vehicles contain similar, complex digital communication
structures. Since there is very limited research describing practical solutions to mitigate
cyberattacks targeting agricultural machinery, there is a need for further research that
could provide solutions to this emerging issue.
The problem statement for this thesis is as follows: What potential solutions can be
used to strengthen the cybersecurity and design process of agricultural machinery
and vehicles?

The problem statement will be answered through three specific

contributions:
1) Demonstrate a case study that calculates the direct financial costs associated with a
specific cyberattack impacting a modern agricultural machine. The results from
this approach will be discussed from the perspective of how this information can
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help mitigate risk and identify potential countermeasures for the specific, modern
agricultural machine.
2) Investigate a modeling methodology, which can be used to aid in the design of
secure agricultural machinery and assist with identifying critical parts of the
subsystem where cybersecurity vulnerabilities could be the most detrimental.
3) Develop STAVE, a Security Testbed for Agricultural Vehicles and Environments,
for identifying and evaluating current machinery or prototypes for cybersecurity
vulnerabilities through testbed solutions.
1.2.

Thesis Outline

The following is an overview of the chapters in this thesis:
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the literature related to modern agricultural
equipment, general cybersecurity terminology, and existing solutions for cybersecurity of
agricultural machinery and the broader agricultural community. Further literature will be
presented throughout the thesis, where appropriate for each chapter.
Chapter 3 presents an approach to analyze the costs associated with a cyberattack
involving an in-season nitrogen application operation. The research contributions for this
chapter will include multiple charts describing the attack, including financial analysis and
a discussion of the broader impacts of cyberattacks targeting modern agricultural
machinery.
Chapter 4 presents an approach to include cybersecurity as a central focus during the
early design process of agricultural machinery. This approach focuses on the use of finite
state machine and automata theory modeling to assist in the identification of security

threats early in the design phases of agricultural machinery. The research contribution
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will present a case-study, where modeling is used to aid in the design of a subsystem on
an agricultural machine: Flexible Structured Robotic Platform (Flex-Ro).
Chapter 5 continues the discussion surrounding the discovery and identification of
cybersecurity vulnerabilities in agricultural machinery and presents STAVE – a Security
Testbed for Agricultural Vehicles and Environments, as one solution to assist in this
effort. The research contribution will be the demonstration of STAVE and testbeds, as a
tool to assist in the identification of cybersecurity vulnerabilities to agricultural
machinery.
Chapter 6 concludes the research and presents potential areas for future research related
to cybersecurity and agricultural machinery.

Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1.

History of Agriculture

Agriculture has seen many major advancements throughout history (Liu et al., 2021).
The first agricultural revolution saw the transition from hunting and gathering to more
organized agriculture as we know it today (Bowles and Choi, 2019). The second
agricultural revolution saw an increase in productivity due to labor availability and the
increase in production of farming grounds (“agricultural revolution,” n.d.). The third
agricultural revolution of the 1950-60’s, or Green Revolution, featured the utilization of
synthetic chemicals and fertilizers which greatly increased the productivity of agricultural
production systems (Pingali, 2012). Modern agriculture, or the fourth agricultural

revolution, will be heavily dependent on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and autonomous
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solutions to solve many current challenges facing agriculture today (Chivers and Rose,
2020). Modern agriculture utilizes precision agricultural techniques which leverage
highly technical equipment to improve productivity (Raj et al., 2021).
Precision agriculture plays a critical role in modern agriculture (“Precision Ag
Definition,” n.d.). Modern farming equipment has made these practices possible, since
this equipment has improved in the collection of high-resolution data for a variety of
production systems. For example, corn production has seen the benefit of modern
technologies in precision agricultural applications and practices such as variable rate
applications or site-specific crop management (Daberkow and McBride, 2000). Variable
rate application refers to the practice of adjusting input rates throughout a field based on a
variety of input factors to maximize profit (Alley et al., 2011). Site-specific crop
management is a more general term that includes variable rate application, with goals of
increasing profitability and sustainability by managing resources based on the specific
‘site’ (Alley et al., 2011). Utilizing variable rate applications, for inputs such as nitrogen,
is an area of research that is being practiced by numerous corn producers across the U.S.
and globally (Iqbal et al., 2020; “Precision Nitrogen Application,” 2014).

7

Figure 2.1: Timeline of agricultural
machinery and cybersecurity

Agricultural equipment has advanced greatly since the introduction of the gasoline
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tractor (Figure 2.1) in 1892 (“The Tractor,” n.d.). With the increase in farming
productivity and acreage per farm, agricultural equipment quickly increased in
horsepower and size. The year 1920 saw the establishment of the Nebraska Tractor Test
Lab (NTTL) as a means for validating tractor performance, as agricultural equipment
advanced rapidly (“NTTL: Only U.S. OECD Tractor Test Lab,” n.d.). Modern
agricultural equipment has been built with as much as 640 horsepower to manage the
large size of many modern farms (“9 Series Tractors | 9RX 640 | John Deere US,” n.d.).
Moreover, the dependence on synthetic chemicals and fertilizer during the Green
Revolution, has increased the need for specialty agricultural equipment such as fertilizer
applicators (“Tractors and Green Revolution in India,” n.d.). Another advancement is the
introduction of Controller Area Network (CAN) in 1986, and its integration into
agricultural equipment in the years that followed, which has allowed for larger equipment
to offer more precision control and functionality (“CAN in Automation (CiA): History of
the CAN technology,” n.d.; John Deere CAN Bus Presentation, 2021). Navigation
innovations such as Real-Time Kinetic (RTK) and the introduction of auto-steer in 1992
and 1999 respectively, have allowed for more precise navigation of agricultural
equipment (“Timeline of Ag Equipment ‘Firsts,’” 2009). Modern equipment is
commonly equipped with Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance, auto-steer, CAN,
telematics, and numerous other technologies that enable equipment to be used for diverse
applications (Baillie et al., 2018).
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Autonomous technologies have greatly advanced over the last decade, with numerous
autonomous technologies being applied to the agricultural industry in efforts to improve
efficiencies and reduce pressure from challenges such as labor shortages (Rose et al.,
2021; Sparrow and Howard, 2021). Some examples of autonomous agricultural
machinery offered by original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) include John Deere’s
newly released autonomous model 8R tractor (Tibken, 2022), Raven’s OMNiPOWER
platform (“Gains For the Farmer and the Farm,” 2022), and the Monarch Electric Tractor
(“Monarch Tractor Electric Tractor,” n.d.). Numerous other autonomous technologies
are being integrated into many other areas of agriculture, including specialty crop
equipment, meatpacking, large combine harvesters and much more. The future will see a
significant amount of automation be integrated into agriculture (Paukner, 2022).
However, with all the introduction of autonomous technologies, cybersecurity will
become a greater concern to the agricultural community.
2.2.

Introduction to Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity is the protection of computer networks, data, and devices from

unauthorized access or criminal use and the practice of ensuring confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of information (Fidler, 2017; “What is Cybersecurity?,” 2019).
Cybersecurity can also include securing areas where computers are used to harm the
greater society such as hate crimes or cyberbullying (Veale and Brown, 2020). The recent
increases in digital technologies and their integration into numerous areas of modern
society, such as industrial control systems, personal home applications, automotive,
agricultural, and business operations, have increased the significance of cybersecurity

(Veale and Brown, 2020). For this thesis, cybersecurity will focus mainly on the
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definition related to the CIA triad and the goal of securing data and computer systems
from unauthorized access or attacks.
The CIA triad of cybersecurity refers to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability
of cyber systems. Confidentiality in cybersecurity means that only authorized people,
parties, or systems can access specific data (Pfleeger et al., 2015). This also could be
known as the principle of least privilege, where only the minimum number of people
necessary are given access to data (Gegick and Barnum, 2005). Within agriculture, there
are many data sources where maintaining confidentiality will give a farmer a competitive
advantage. For example, the leaking of confidential data pertaining to the specific
operations of a farm, such as yield or agrochemical inputs, could help an adversary to
‘understand potential market drivers or to identify struggling farms with underutilized
land that can be bought lower than the standard market price’ (Baker and Green, 2020).
A lack of confidentiality could potentially expose a farmer or personnel’s private
information, leading to identity fraud.
Integrity within the cybersecurity context means that data or systems remain
consistent and unaltered, unless modified in appropriate ways by authorized parties
(Pfleeger et al., 2015). In the context of agriculture, examples of data or systems that
require integrity include planting population maps, fertilizer input prescriptions, heating
ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems to cool livestock, or livestock feeding
rations (Baker and Green, 2020). Integrity in agriculture could also pertain to equipment
operation commands or irrigation schedules (Chamarajnagar and Ashok, 2019). The loss
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of integrity of these time-critical datasets or systems could lead to significant profit losses
or damages extending beyond the farming operation (Boghossian et al., 2018).
Availability within cybersecurity means that a system or dataset is useable or
accessible when expected or needed (Pfleeger et al., 2015). Availability of many timecritical systems such as agricultural equipment, logistics, or operation management
datasets are crucial for optimal efficiency and profitability. A loss of availability could
require farmers to use legacy systems, if available, or pay a ransom to make systems
available, in the case of ransomware (Baker and Green, 2020; Sontowski et al., 2020).
2.3.

Cybersecurity Concerns in the Agriculture Community
Cyberattacks targeting agriculture have become more prevalent over the past few

years. Two recent Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reports (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2021; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2022) have outlined numerous
cyberattacks that have targeted entities in the agricultural sector. The first report (Federal
Bureau of Investigation, 2021) published in September 2021, brought awareness to the
fact that ransomware attacks could cause financial loss and ultimately impact the food
supply chain. An important attack highlighted in the report was the JBS meatpacking
cyberattack in May 2021, that caused major disruptions to meat prices and resulted in
JBS paying a $11 million ransom (“Meat giant JBS pays $11m in ransom to resolve
cyber-attack,” 2021). Another attack targeted a US farm in January 2021, which
ultimately resulted in $9 million in losses. The second FBI report (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2022) in April 2022 warned that ransomware cyberattacks could
strategically target agricultural producers during critical seasons such as planting and

harvesting. The report noted that there were six known cyberattacks targeting grain
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cooperatives in the fall of 2021 and two attacks in early spring 2022.
There have also been numerous studies that have investigated cybersecurity solutions
to the general agricultural community. For example, a study conducted in Finland
focused on cybersecurity practices and requirements for communication networks within
six dairy farms (Nikander et al., 2020). In a study conducted by (West, 2018), a
prediction model framework was created to assess and quantify cybersecurity
vulnerabilities in technology and the precision agricultural environment it is adapted to.
Smart farming is another name for the data-driven, precision farming techniques of
modern agriculture. Multiple studies discuss cybersecurity to smart farming systems
such as (Barreto and Amaral, 2018) which highlights some important cybersecurity
challenges to smart farming such as preventing denial of service (DoS) attacks to
important IoT sensors. A thorough literature survey conducted by Demestichas et al.
(2020), compiles a large amount of studies that discuss threats to smart farming and
internet of things (IoT) devices in agriculture. The survey by Demestichas et al.
highlights the fact that technologies, such as IoT devices, are being rapidly adopted and
stakeholders need to exercise caution with how they adopt the new technologies to avoid
costly cyberattacks. Gupta et al. (2020), presents more challenges to smart farming
including a discussion on the multi-layer layout of the modern farming communication
architecture and some examples of possible cyberattacks (Gupta et al., 2020). The Jahn
Research Group discusses smart farming cybersecurity challenges related to food
processing and the lack of cyber insurance coverage (Jahn et al., 2019). Yazdinejad et al.
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(2021), conducted another thorough study of smart farming vulnerabilities and presented
a case study on the process of a cyberattack (Yazdinejad et al., 2021). The study also
presented a classification framework of attacks that target precision agriculture.
IoT devices will be common throughout smart farming and future farming practices.
Ahanger and Aljumah, (2019), discuss security issues and defense mechanisms to protect
IoT devices and found that there is need for improvement in the security of these devices
(Ahanger and Aljumah, 2019). Ametepe et al. (2019), discusses a secure encryption
method for IoT devices since the devices contain limited computational resources, as
compared to larger computing devices that employ more robust data encryption methods
(Ametepe et al., 2019). Angyalos et al. (2021), discusses the challenges with securing
the modern agricultural system and that currently the benefits outweigh the risks of
implementing modern technologies (Angyalos et al., 2021). The integrity of the data
produced by IoT devices in agricultural settings is discussed in a paper by Chamarajnagar
and Ashok (2019) and found in their use-case analysis that threats to IoT devices could
potentially be identified with 80% real-time accuracy and 90% precision. IoT-based
agricultural devices and blockchain are investigated in a study by (Ferrag et al., 2020)
and found that there are many areas, such as the design of practical and compatible
cryptographic protocols, that need further research. Cybersecurity of IoT devices for the
application of water management in agriculture, are also an important challenge to
address since they could affect much more beyond the farm (Kamienski et al., 2018).
Some possible solutions to improve cybersecurity include the discussion of intrusion
detection systems. A survey by (Ferrag et al., 2022) evaluates current intrusion detection

systems used to protect assets of the Agricultural 4.0 era. Prodanović et al., presents a
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data security model to protect agricultural wireless sensor networks (WSN) and found
that it is possible to optimize hardware and software resources to protect such networks
(Prodanović et al., 2020).
Cyberbiosecurity is discussed in a paper by (Duncan et al., 2019) which is the
combination between cybersecurity, biosecurity, and cyber-physical security. The paper
mentions the need for a coherent effort to address these issues across the United States
(U.S.) agricultural landscape. Geil et al. (2018), conducted a survey of farmers in the
U.S. to assess cybersecurity practices and found that there are large gaps in security
knowledge in the agricultural community (Geil et al., 2018). Outside the United States, a
report by researchers from Australia discussed the need for cybersecurity and if producers
are properly prepared for cyberattacks (Borohl, 2021).
2.4.

Cybersecurity Concerns to Agricultural Machinery and Vehicles
Agricultural machines perform many crucial tasks such as spraying, planting, and

harvesting. Automation can already be found on many subsystems of current agricultural
machinery, such as CNH’s OptiSpread (Eckelkamp and Humphreys, 2022) on combine
harvesters, with more levels of autonomy to come in the near future. Many of these
automated features on agricultural machines will be controlled remotely with wireless
cellular networks through platforms such as JD Operation Center application for John
Deere Equipment (“Data Management | Operations Center | John Deere US,” n.d.).
Security of all devices and machines in the farming infrastructure will be important.
Currently there are no documented cases of cyberattacks that targeted agricultural
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machinery specifically, although there are some related cyber instances. A cyberattack in
May 2022 targeted a major agricultural machinery manufacturer, AGCO, which resulted
in the shutdown of multiple parts of their IT system (Rattigan, 2022). Although not a
cyberattack, John Deere demonstrated the capability to remotely shut down tractors after
they were stolen from Ukrainian farmers (Holderith, 2022).
There also has been specific research to investigate solutions to cybersecurity
vulnerabilities on agricultural machinery. One study demonstrated a Denial of Service
(DoS) attack to on-field sensors with applications to agricultural equipment (Sontowski et
al., 2020). The limited number of practical solutions presented in literature for
cybersecurity of agricultural machinery and the warning that cybersecurity of agricultural
technologies and machinery is not being given enough serious consideration (Boghossian
et al., 2018), highlights the need to investigate solutions for these critical agricultural
machines.

Chapter 3: IMPACTS OF CYBERATTACKS TO PRECISION
AGRICULTURAL OPERATIONS
This chapter presents a case study that will build a hypothetical scenario of a
cyberattack targeting a critical farming operation: in-season nitrogen application to corn.
An investigation of the tangible and intangible effects of the cyberattack to the farmer
and broader agricultural community will be analyzed to determine how the significance
of such attacks should inform cybersecurity mitigation decisions for agricultural

machinery. The quantity of financial resources that should be invested to secure
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agricultural machinery during the design process will also be discussed.
3.1.

Background
Commodity corn production makes up about 24% of the United States (U.S.) cash

crop industry with 15.1 billion bushels being produced in 2021 (Barrett, 2022). This
equates to approximately $48 billion in annual revenue (Kassel, 2022). Water, soil, light,
and proper nutrients are all important for optimal corn yields, with the average US corn
yield totaling 177.0 bushels/acre in 2021 (Barrett, 2022). Nitrogen is one of the key
nutrients in corn production, as research has shown a high correlation between plant
available nitrogen and yield (Puntel et al., 2016; Shapiro, n.d.). Nitrogen can be supplied
to a corn crop from many sources such as synthetic fertilizers, manure, and crop residues.
Since nitrogen is a mobile nutrient, proper management is needed to prevent nitrogen
loss, resulting in negative environmental impacts and profit losses. As of March 2022,
nitrogen fertilizer prices were at record highs, with costs ranging from $0.93$1.10/pounds of nitrogen (Quinn and Reporter, 2022), increasing the urgency for proper
nitrogen management practices.
Nitrogen management has been an important topic of research for many years in
efforts to increase farmer’s profits and decrease the negative environmental impacts
resulting from poor management practices (Cassman et al., 2002). Most farmers rely on
synthetic fertilizers as a main source of nitrogen for their corn crops, with common
synthetic nitrogen fertilizers being Anhydrous Ammonia (NH3), Urea, and UAN(2832%) (Sellars and Nunes, 2021). Anhydrous Ammonia can be injected into the soil in the

fall or early spring before planting and is the source from which many other synthetic
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nitrogen fertilizers are made (Sellars and Nunes, 2021). Urea can be broadcast as a dry
fertilizer and incorporated into the soil to prevent nitrogen volatilization (Shaver, 2014).
Urea Ammonium Nitrate (UAN 28-32%) are liquid fertilizers that can be applied inseason and are typically safer to handle than other synthetic nitrogen fertilizers (Sellars
and Nunes, 2021; Shaver, 2014). Research has shown that corn requires nitrogen at
various points during the growing season, with the highest uptake occurring around V10
(Bender et al., 2013; “Nitrogen stabilizers,” 2018; Sellars and Nunes, 2021). To prevent
nitrogen losses due to leaching or volatilization after an early season nitrogen application,
in-season nitrogen applications have been recommended so the corn crop can utilize
nitrogen soon after it is applied (Shaver, 2014). Side-dress nitrogen application of liquid
fertilizer or fertigation have become common methods for in-season nitrogen application
(Stansell, 2021).
Since there are multiple forms of nitrogen fertilizer, different types of fertilizer
application equipment have evolved. Broadcast spreaders are used to apply granular
nitrogen fertilizer. Anhydrous ammonia fertilizer injection equipment is built to handle
pressurized anhydrous ammonia, where modern equipment is capable of variable rate
applications. Liquid side dress equipment is built to inject liquid nitrogen sources close
to the crop. Side dress equipment has evolved from ground driven units to hydraulic or
electrically controlled units that are capable of variable rate applications. The rest of the
background section will focus on nitrogen side-dress equipment as applied to this case
study.

Nitrogen side-dress equipment is built around some fundamental technologies.
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Liquid nitrogen fertilizer originates in a tank and is moved through a series of pumps and
valves to the output nozzles (Figure 1.1). Side-dress equipment has progressed from
ground driven pumps with fixed output rates to more modern equipment with variable
application rate capabilities. Modern, variable-rate nitrogen equipment can be controlled
over the CAN bus, operating under the ISOBUS or ISO 11783 protocol (“NUTRIPLACER® 920 & 2800 FERTILIZER APPLICATORS,” n.d.). Commands are sent
from the tractor which control the pressure and flow rate produced from a pump on the
implement. Section control valves are utilized downstream from the pump, to control the
flow to various sections or nozzles across the implement. Finally, nozzles are sized to
facilitate the proper flow rates needed for a given operation. Flow meters and pressure
gauges are built into the implement which provide feedback on the current state of the
implement over the CAN bus, which can be displayed on the virtual terminal in the
tractor. This allows the operator to get real-time feedback on the state of the operation.

Figure 3.1 Liquid Side-Dress Equipment

This chapter will contribute to this thesis by demonstrating the potential financial
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significance that a cyberattack targeting a precision agricultural operation could have by
providing charts, financial estimates, of discussions of the attacks. Section 3.2 outlines
the research methodology used to analyze and calculate the tangible and intangible
impact of a cyberattack to in-season nitrogen operations. Section 3.3 describes the results
and analysis of three hypothetical cyberattack scenarios. Section 3.4 will also discuss the
results and broader impacts to the agricultural community and future agricultural
machinery.
3.2.
3.2.1.

Research Methodology
Case Study Criteria

Since there is a high degree of variability between farming operations, this case study
will use a hypothetical 100-acre rainfed corn farming scenario, where a nitrogen sidedress application is altered by a cyberattack. The goal of this case study is to demonstrate
the specific and broader impacts from a cyberattack to an agricultural operation and how
they can inform mitigation and equipment design decisions. Some criteria and
assumptions were needed to build this case study which fall under four categories:
machinery, field location, nitrogen recommendation, and yield calculation.
First, for these cyberattacks to be feasible, the machinery will need to be modern,
with variable rate capabilities. Since a cyberattack would ultimately result in the
manipulation of the implement applying nitrogen, any implements without variable rate
capabilities or that are not controlled by messages sent from a tractor operating the
implement, will have no practical means of undergoing a cyberattack. Many large farms

in the US are equipped with modern, variable-rate application equipment which makes
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this assumption reasonable. A second criteria of the machinery is that the physical
constraints of the implement allow for the specific cyberattack to take place. For
example, the implement would need to have the capability to increase chemical
application pressure and flow rate to reach the outlined attack application rates. The
implement would also need application orifices that allow for a large variation in
fertilizer application rates.
The location for this hypothetical case study will be Saunders County, Nebraska.
Yield goals, soil nitrate levels, and soil organic matter levels will all be generated from
values relative to Saunders County. The average yearly precipitation of Saunders County
is 31 inches (“PRISM Climate Group at Oregon State University,” 2021) with a Hot
Summer Continental Climate according to the Koppen Climate Classification (“Omaha,
Nebraska Koppen Climate Classification (Weatherbase),” n.d.). The average yield for
rainfed cornfields in Saunders County, Nebraska is around 155 bushels/acre for rainfed
corn fields from 2008-2018 (“USDA - National Agricultural Statistics Service - Quick
Stats Lite,” 2018), therefore yield target values will be set between 150-190 bushels per
acre for the hypothetical scenario.

𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = [35 + (1.2 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) − (8 × 𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂3 − 𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝) − (0.14 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 ×
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂) − 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑁𝑁 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐] × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 × 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

where
𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = recommended nitrogen input for corn grain (lb/ac)
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = expected yield (bu/ac)
𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂3 − 𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = average nitrate-N concentration in the root
zone (2–4 foot depth) in parts per million

(Eq. 1)

𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = percent soil organic matter (min 0.5%, max 3%)
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑁𝑁 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = include N from previous legume crop,
manure and other organic material applied, and irrigation
water N.
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = price adjustment coefficient
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = adjustment factor for fall, spring, and split
applications = 0.95 for split application
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This case study will use the UNL nitrogen formula since it was developed using fields
across Nebraska (Shapiro et al., 2019). The UNL Nitrogen formula (Eq. 1) considers
numerous factors when calculating optimal nitrogen fertilizer rates (𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ) for a corn crop.
Expected yield (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) is the first factor in the equation, where farmers can target specific

yield goals for the upcoming corn crop based on factors such as historic yield data. This
case study will assume that the yield target values are set to the highest average yield
values that are appropriate for the specific field based on historic yield data. Soil nitrate
levels (𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂3 − 𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ) and soil organic matter (𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂) are the next factors in the equation,

which can be determined through soil tests. Other nitrogen contributions (Figure 3.2)

from previous legumes, manure, crop residues, and irrigation water are also factored into
the equation. Finally, nitrogen application timing (Figure 3.2) and price adjustment (Eq.
2) are used to adjust the recommended amount of nitrogen for a given corn crop.
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Figure 3.2: UNL Nitrogen Formula Nitrogen Credits and Timing Adjustments

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 0.263 + �0.1256 ∗

𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐

𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛

� − �0.00421 ∗ �𝑃𝑃

where
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = price adjustment coefficient
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = price of corn ($/bu)
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = price of nitrogen ($/lb)

𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = max [𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , min �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ,

𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐

𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛

2

� �

(Eq. 2)

𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
+(8∗𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂3 −𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝)−35+𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑁𝑁 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐�
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ×𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

�𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃

1.2−(0.14∗𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂)

where:
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = expected yield (bu/ac)
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = minimum expected yield (bu/ac)
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = maximum expected yield (bu/ac)
𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = recommended nitrogen input for corn grain (lb/ac)
𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂3 − 𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = average nitrate-N concentration in the root
zone (2–4 foot depth) in parts per million
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = percent soil organic matter (min 0.5%, max 3%)
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑁𝑁 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = include N from previous legume crop,
manure and other organic material applied, and irrigation
water N.
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = price adjustment coefficient
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = adjustment factor for fall, spring, and split

�]

(Eq. 3)
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applications = 0.95 for split application
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = max [𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , min �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ,

�𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃

𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ×𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

+(8∗𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂3 −𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝)−35+𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑁𝑁 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐�
1.2−(0.14∗𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂)

where:
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = actual yield (bu/ac)
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = minimum expected yield (bu/ac)
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = maximum expected yield (bu/ac)
𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = actual nitrogen input for corn grain (lb/ac)
𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂3 − 𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = average nitrate-N concentration in the root
zone (2–4 foot depth) in parts per million
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = percent soil organic matter (min 0.5%, max 3%)
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑁𝑁 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = include N from previous legume crop,
manure and other organic material applied, and irrigation
water N.
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = price adjustment coefficient
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = adjustment factor for fall, spring, and split
applications = 0.95 for split application

�]

(Eq. 4)

A real case study could try these scenarios on actual corn and measure the resulting
yield after the cyberattacks. Since this case study is only building hypothetical scenarios,
a formula derived from the UNL nitrogen formula will be used to calculate yield.
Expected (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) and actual yield (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) will be calculated by rearranging the UNL Nitrogen
formula to solve for yield. Eq. 3 and Eq. 4 demonstrate how 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 are calculated
respectively. The maximum and minimum attainable yield on this field (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 and

𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ) will be set as follows. A 30-bushel yield boost above expected yield values will
be the maximum attainable yield if nitrogen is overapplied above prescribed rates. The

30-bushel yield boost is an arbitrary number and is set to limit maximum yield values that
are unrealistic for the specific conditions and location of this hypothetical scenario. This

assumes that yield target values (EY) are set at the highest, reasonably attainable value
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across the field, therefore gaining more than a 30-bushel yield boost by overapplying
nitrogen would be unrealistic. The minimum attainable yield value will be 100-bushels.
This means that if no nitrogen is applied to the planted corn, the corn would still yield
100-bushels. The reality is yield values could be lower than 100-bushels if no nitrogen is
applied, but this number is set to limit unrealistically low yield values. Corn prices vary
depending on market prices and the quality of the corn being sold. For this study, it will
be assumed that all corn will be sold at a constant price of $7.53 based on the market
price as of March 22, 2022 (“Corn PRICE Today | Corn Spot Price Chart | Live Price of
Corn per Ounce | Markets Insider,” n.d.). Since this case study scenario will be based on
an application of UAN32, a nitrogen price of $1.10/lb will be used based on prices as of
March 22, 2022 (Quinn and Reporter, 2022).
Since nitrogen is a key nutrient in the production of corn, the following scenarios will
look to demonstrate the potential profit losses incurred from cyberattacks to in-season
nitrogen applications for corn. The first section will outline what a typical in-season
nitrogen application operation would look like, while the following sections will discuss
three potential attack scenarios and their impacts.
3.2.2.

Control Scenario

All hypothetical scenarios in this case study will use a 100-acre corn field, divided
into 100, one-acre management zones (Figure 3.3). The UNL nitrogen formula (Eq. 1)
will be used to calculate nitrogen needs for each one-acre section for optimal corn
production. Figure 3.4 shows the hypothetical 100-acre corn field, with yield goals for

each one-acre section. Yield goals were selected randomly from a range of 150-190
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bushels/acre based on historic yield values for rainfed corn fields in Saunders County,
Nebraska (“USDA - National Agricultural Statistics Service - Quick Stats Lite,” 2018).
Figure 3.5 shows the 100-acre field with various soil nitrate levels, selected randomly
from a range of 2.0-4.0ppm which are realistic for fields with fine-textured soil in central
Nebraska (Shapiro et al., 2019). Similarly, soil organic matter values were randomly
selected from a range of 1.8-2.2% which are also realistic for fields with fine-textured
soil in central Nebraska (“Soil Management for Increased Soil Organic Matter (G2283),”
n.d.). The timing factor will be set at 0.95 since nitrogen applications will be split
between at-planting and in-season applications. All case study scenarios will use a
nitrogen price of $1.10 per pound (Quinn and Reporter, 2022) and a corn price of $7.53
per bushel (“Corn PRICE Today | Corn Spot Price Chart | Live Price of Corn per Ounce |
Markets Insider,” n.d.) which are based on current average prices as of March 22, 2022.
Using Eq. 2 the price adjustment factor is calculated to be 0.926. All these same input
values and methods will be used across all attack scenarios in this case study.
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Figure 3.3 100-acre field with 1-acre management zones

Figure 3.4: Estimated Corn Yield Values
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Figure 3.5: Soil Nitrate Levels
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Figure 3.6: Soil Organic Matter Levels

Using Eq. 1, nitrogen needs (𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ) can be calculated for acre A1. By using input

values of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 175 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏/𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, 𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂3 − 𝑁𝑁 = 3.1𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝, 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = 2.2%, 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑁𝑁 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 0,
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 0.926, and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 0.95, 𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 can be calculated to be 147 lb/ac for

acre A1. This same method will be used to calculate total nitrogen recommendations for
each acre in the 100-acre field (Figure 3.7).
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Figure 3.7: Total recommended nitrogen input for growing season (lbs/acre)

For all application scenarios in this paper, the nitrogen applications will be split
25% at planting and 75% in-season.

This is consistent with many field trials and

recommendations for in-season nitrogen management (Shapiro et al., 2019). The in-season
applications will be applied through liquid side-dress applications using the fertilizer
source UAN32. Only the in-season side-dress operation, or 75% of the total nitrogen
applied to the field will be affected by the cyberattack. Figure 3.7 shows the total nitrogen
needs calculated using the UNL nitrogen formula for the 100-acre field in this case study.
Figure 3.8 demonstrates the pre-plant and in-season nitrogen needs for the 100-acre field.
These same nitrogen recommendations remain the same across all scenarios in this casestudy.
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Figure 3.8: Pre-plant recommended nitrogen application rates (lbs/acre)
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Figure 3.9: In-season recommended nitrogen application rates (lbs/acre)

3.2.3.

Calculating Financial Impacts

Profit potential loss or gain (𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ) will be used to compare cyberattack scenarios. The

first step in calculating profit is to calculate the expected and actual yield for the given
scenario. Expected yield (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) and actual yield (𝐴𝐴𝑌𝑌) will be calculated using Eq. 3 and 4

respectively. For the control case, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸, since no cyberattack occurs. For the attack
scenarios, there will be a difference in expected and actual yield values, which will lead to
a difference in revenue and profit. Figure 3.10 shows the expected or actual yield values
for the control case.
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Figure 3.10: Actual (calculated) corn yield values (bu/acre)

After calculating yield values, Eq. 5-11 can be used to calculate 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 . Eq. 5 is used

to calculate total expected revenue (𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 ) for the field. Based on an expected yield total
(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ) of 16,983bu and the price of corn (𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ) of $7.53/bu, the total expected revenue
for the control case comes to $127,882. Eq. 6 can be used to calculate the expected cost of
nitrogen fertilizer, 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 . Using a value of 14,758lbs of total recommended nitrogen

(𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 ) for the field and a nitrogen cost (𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ) of $1.10/lb, the total expected cost

can be calculated at $16,232 for the control scenario. Eq. 7 can then be used to calculate
total expected profit (𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 ) which totals $111,648 for the control case. Since all case study
scenarios will use the same nitrogen recommendation starting values, all scenarios will

have an expected profit of $111,648.
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Similar to Eq. 5, actual revenue (𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ) can be

calculated using Eq. 8. For the control case, 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = $127,882 since expected and
actual yield values are the same. 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 can be calculated to $16,232 for the control case, by

using Eq. 9. 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 is calculated at $111,648 for the control case using Eq. 10. Finally, 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿

can be calculated to $0 for the control case using Eq. 11, since no cyberattack occurs. This
same method will be used to calculate profit loss or gain for all attack scenarios.
𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐

(Eq. 5)

𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 ∗ 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛

(Eq. 6)

𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 − 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒

(Eq. 7)

𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐

(Eq. 8)

where:
𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = expected revenue ($)
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = expected total yield (bu)
𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = value of corn grain ($/bu)

where:
𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = expected total cost ($)
𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = expected total pounds of nitrogen to be applied (lb)
𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = cost of nitrogen per pound ($/lb)

where:
𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = total expected profit ($)
𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = expected revenue ($)
𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = expected total cost ($)

where:
𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = actual revenue ($)
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = actual total yield (bu)
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𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = value of corn grain ($/bu)
𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∗ 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛

(Eq. 9)

𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

(Eq. 10)

𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 − 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

(Eq. 11)

where:
𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = actual total cost ($)
𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = actual total pounds of nitrogen to be applied (lb)
𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = cost of nitrogen per pound ($/lb)

where:
𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = total actual profit ($)
𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = actual revenue ($)
𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = actual total cost ($)

where:
𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = profit loss or gain ($)
𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = total expected profit ($)
𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = total actual profit ($)
3.2.4.

Attack Scenarios

This section outlines the strategy of the attack scenarios. The cyberattack for this case
study will target the tractor and implement applying side dress nitrogen. The goal of the
cyberattack will be to increase or decrease prescribed application rates while applying the
same cumulative total of prescribed nitrogen across the field. Many other attack scenarios
could be assessed such as applying as much nitrogen as possible over the smallest area.
This case study looks specifically at this strategic attack to assess if a cyberattack strategy
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could be used that causes significant financial loss while making the operation appear
normal. Figure 3.11 shows the attack strategy for attack scenario 1. Each one-acre
subsection of the field is adjusted by a factor of 50%, 75%, 100%, 150% or 200% of
prescribed rates. For example, acre B5 would apply 50% of the prescribed rate of nitrogen
while acre H4 would apply 200% of prescribed rates. The placement of the rate adjustment
acres is random across the field.

Attack 1 - % of Prescribed N Rates
A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

1

100% 150% 50% 100% 50% 150% 100% 50%

2

200% 75%

3

75% 150% 150% 200% 150% 75% 150% 75%

4

50% 100% 50%

5

150% 50% 150% 50% 200% 75%

6

75% 150% 75%

7

100% 75% 100% 50% 100% 50% 150% 100% 150% 100%

8

50%

75%

50%

9

50% 200% 100% 50% 150% 150% 50% 100% 50%

50%

10

50%

75% 100% 50% 100% 75%

75%

50% 200%

50% 100% 50%
50% 200%

75% 100% 100% 200% 50% 100%
50%

50% 200% 150%

75% 100% 200% 200% 100% 100% 50%

50% 150% 100% 50%

50% 150% 75%

75% 100% 150% 75% 200% 50%
Figure 3.11: Cyberattack Scenario 1

50% 100% 150%
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Attack scenario 2 takes a more strategic approach to the placement of the attack. The
attack will result in applications of 45% and 280% of prescribed rates across the field.
Figure 3.12 demonstrates the layout of attack 2.

Figure 3.12: Cyberattack Scenario 2

Attack scenario 3 again takes a strategic approach to fertilizer prescription rate
adjustment throughout the field. Figure 3.13 demonstrates attack 3, where fertilizer rates
are applied at 75%, 100%, or 200% of prescribed rates.
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Figure 3.13: Cyberattack Scenario 3

3.3.

Results
This section will present how each of the cyberattack scenarios will affect the

prescribed nitrogen rates across hypothetical field. The resulting yield values will be
calculated along with the potential profit loss or gain for each cyberattack scenario.
3.3.1.

Attack Scenario 1

All attack scenarios result in a deviation from prescribed nitrogen application rates.
Figure 3.14 shows in-season nitrogen application rates after attack 1. For attack 1,
𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 14,758lb and 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 14,781lb. Since there is a 23lb or 0.2% increase in
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actual vs. prescribed rates, the attack satisfies the assumptions that total cumulative pounds
of prescribed and applied nitrogen to the field remains constant.
Second Nitrogen Application Actual Rates [lbs/acre]
A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

1

110

153

57

105

50

185

117

56

57

208

2

213

76

95

114

51

122

79

54

121

52

3

71

188

188

248

150

84

163

77

59

206

4

49

116

58

86

87

115

103

205

63

122

5

166

48

151

51

247

80

60

60

197

152

6

79

148

71

80

114

224

220

113

112

50

7

110

89

97

52

109

64

160

113

158

121

8

59

57

164

115

57

63

168

79

81

63

9

51

223

117

52

166

155

57

102

54

53

10

53

80

116

179

81

234

64

47

116

179

Figure 3.14: Prescribed vs. Actual nitrogen application rates (lbs/acre) after attack 1

UAN32 will be used as the source of nitrogen for in-season nitrogen applications.
UAN32 is 32% nitrogen by weight (“Technical Data Sheet: Urea Ammonium Nitrate,”
n.d.). Figure 3.15 shows the UAN32 application rates in gal/ac required to attain the
nitrogen application rates shown in Figure 3.14. The cyberattack resulted in an additional
7gal above the total prescribed amount of UAN32 applied across the field.
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Second UAN32 Liquid Nitrogen Application Actual Rates [gal/acre]
A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

1

31

43

16

30

14

53

33

16

16

59

2

60

22

27

32

15

35

22

15

34

15

3

20

53

54

71

43

24

46

22

17

58

4

14

33

16

25

25

33

29

58

18

35

5

47

14

43

15

70

23

17

17

56

43

6

23

42

20

23

32

64

62

32

32

14

7

31

25

28

15

31

18

46

32

45

34

8

17

16

47

33

16

18

48

22

23

18

9

14

63

33

15

47

44

16

29

15

15

10

15

23

33

51

23

67

18

13

33

51

Figure 3.15: Expected vs. Actual application rates of UAN32 (gal/acre) after attack 1

By using Eq. 4, the actual yield can be calculated for each acre across the 100-acre
field. Figure 3.16 shows a comparison between expected and actual yield after attack 1.
The total expected yield, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 , for the field remained at 16,983bu while the actual corn
yield, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 , totaled 15,243bu for the field. This resulted in a 1,740bu loss as a result of

the cyberattack. On a per-acre basis, this equates to a 17.4bu yield penalty per acre for the

hypothetical 100-acre field.
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Total Actual Corn Yield (AY) [bu/acre, AYmin=100bu/acre,
AYmax=EY+30bu/acre]
A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

1

175

187

104

168

100

219

181

106

110

188

2

191

131

150

172

103

190

119

100

180

100

3

121

220

214

215

181

147

206

122

102

187

4

100

172

107

146

138

173

155

186

108

178

5

193

100

180

100

216

137

102

108

180

183

6

129

190

122

137

184

208

195

170

172

100

7

169

152

155

100

164

111

192

168

192

186

8

106

102

199

176

117

110

214

128

136

111

9

100

193

187

100

196

192

100

159

100

100

10

107

132

190

201

137

211

112

100

176

205

Figure 3.16: Expected vs. Actual (calculated) yield after attack 1

Using Eqs. 5-11, total profit loss and profit loss per acre can be calculated. Figure
3.17 shows the profit loss or gain for each 1-acre section of the 100-acre field. The
farmer would remain profitable but lose $13,129 of potential profit (𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ) across the 100-

acre field because of attack 1. This averages to about $131/ac of potential profit loss.
Figure 3.18 shows a financial summary of the financial impacts from attack 1. An

adjustment in the (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ) values, relative to average yield, could affect the
per-acre profitability.
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Difference Between Actual and Expected Profit (PLG) [$]
A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

1

0

170

-463

0

-337

158

0

-460

-468

112

2

109

-209

-251

0

-427

0

-210

-430

0

-372

3

-194

157

157

89

171

-231

166

-203

-481

113

4

-322

0

-472

-244

-240

0

0

113

-510

0

5

165

-339

171

-403

90

-217

-476

-509

117

170

6

-221

171

-198

-223

0

103

105

0

0

-397

7

0

-243

0

-357

0

-516

167

0

168

0

8

-495

-480

166

0

-481

-519

164

-220

-221

-519

9

-366

103

0

-342

165

169

-449

0

-408

-408

10

-444

-213

0

160

-221

97

-513

-332

0

160

Figure 3.17: Potential-Profit loss or gain per acre resulting from attack 1

Figure 3.18: Financial impacts from attack 1

3.3.2.

Attack Scenario 2
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Figure 3.19 demonstrates in-season nitrogen input rates after attack 2 as compared to
the prescribed rates. Nitrogen totals of 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 14,758lbs and 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 14,733lbs are

essentially equal with only a 25lb or 0.2% difference. This again satisfies the assumption
that the cumulative total of recommended and applied nitrogen remains essentially equal.

Figure 3.19: Prescribed vs. Actual nitrogen application rates (lbs/acre) after attack 2

Figure 3.20 demonstrates the UAN32 rates for this scenario. There is a 7gal
reduction in UAN32 applied over the 100-acre field as a result of attack 2.
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Figure 3.20: Expected vs. Actual application rates of UAN32 (gal/acre) after attack 2

Yield values are displayed in Figure 3.21 resulting from attack 2. The total expected
yield, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 , remained at 16,983bu while the actual yield for the field, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 , came to

12,692bu which results in a 4,291bu yield penalty as a result of attack 2. Over the whole
field, attack 2 results in a 42.9bu/acre yield penalty.
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Figure 3.21: Expected vs. Actual (calculated) yield after attack 2

Figure 3.22 demonstrates the potential profit loss or gain per acre. Over the entire field,
total potential profit loss, 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 , came to $32,281 which averages at $323/acre. Figure 3.23

provides a summary of the financial impacts from attack 2.
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Figure 3.22: Potential-Profit loss or gain per acre resulting from attack 2

Figure 3.23: Financial impacts from attack 2

3.3.3.

Attack Scenario 3
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Actual nitrogen rates were affected by attack 3 as seen in Figure 3.24. Under attack 3,
𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 remained at 14,758lbs while 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 , was equal to 14,795lbs applied with a
resulting 37lb or 0.3% discrepancy.

Figure 3.24: Prescribed vs. Actual nitrogen application rates (lbs/acre) after attack 3

Figure 3.25 shows the UAN32 application rates with an increase of 11gal of total
UAN32 applied of the 100acre field as a result of attack 3.
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Figure 3.25: Expected vs. Actual application rates of UAN32 (gal/acre) after attack 3

The impact on yield from attack 3 can be seen in Figure 3.26. Attack 3 saw 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 =

16,983bu and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 15,061bu with a 1,922bu yield penalty. This averages to a
19.2bu/acre yield penalty as a result of attack 3.

Figure 3.26: Expected vs. Actual (calculated) yield after attack 3
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Total profit loss for this attack totaled $14,514 with an average $145/acre profit loss.
Figure 3.27 shows the profit loss or gain per acre, while Figure 3.28 shows the financial
impacts summary from attack 3.

Figure 3.27: Potential-Profit loss or gain per acre resulting from attack 3
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Figure 3.28: Financial impacts from attack 3

3.4.

Discussion
A high yielding corn crop in modern agriculture relies on timely and precise

application of nitrogen. Since determining corn yield targets, soil measurements, and
recommended nitrogen input rates will continue to be more precises and site-specific as
machinery and research continues to advance, any variation in optimized nitrogen input
rates has the potential to cause profit loss. This case study demonstrated three scenarios
where random and strategic increases and decreases of prescribed nitrogen input rates led
to significant potential profit loss. A cyberattack that targets a tractor and implement
applying nitrogen in-season, with the intent of varying application rates, could have
major consequences. Since modern farmers are very reliant on the integrated digital
technologies in agricultural machinery when applying complex nitrogen prescriptions,
any change in application rates as demonstrated in these attack scenarios would be hard
to detect if the digital monitoring technologies appeared normal. If the cyberattack were

also able to alter the display unit in the tractor that provides feedback on the as-applied
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rates, detecting these types of cyberattacks would become even harder. The future use of
autonomous tractors for farming applications such as side-dress nitrogen application
could add an additional level of difficulty in detecting a cyberattack such as this. On top
of this, once nitrogen is already applied in a field, it is impossible to determine the exact
rates that were applied, although the rates can be estimated using imaging technologies
after the corn has had enough time to respond. The resulting yield penalties will be seen
at harvest, although it may be hard to detect if yield variation was due to the cyberattack
or other unknown issues.
The potential profit loss associated with these cyberattack situations could be
significant, especially when technologies are being integrated into farming machinery to
optimize fields in decreasingly smaller management zones. Before the era of precision
farming, farmers would overapply many fertilizer inputs such as nitrogen, with the aim of
attaining high yields. As nitrogen prices have increased, farmers have become more
aware of the benefits of precision agricultural techniques for maximizing profit.
Therefore, cyberattacks that target precision agricultural technologies and machinery
could be very detrimental to the goals of maximizing profitability. One might argue that
an overapplication of nitrogen could protect against a cyberattack such as the attacks
outlined in this case study. Although that might be true if a farmer knew they would
experience a cyberattack, the total amount of overapplied nitrogen needed would not only
be a large financial burden but could also create other impacts to areas such as water

quality, hence the push to optimize nitrogen inputs through precision agricultural
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practices.
The degree of significance of a cyberattack to a precision farming operation is
dependent on many factors as seen by the attack scenarios in this case study. Since a
farmer could experience profit losses on the level of $100/acre or more as demonstrated
in this study (Figure 3.29), it is important that cybersecurity measures are taken to ensure
the security of agricultural machinery. Although security measures could be added to an

Figure 3.29: Profit and Cost Comparison Between Attacks

agricultural machine after a cyberattack occurs, including security in the design process
of agricultural machinery will be a much more effective approach to preventing
cyberattacks in the future. Agricultural equipment that contains the capabilities to
improve security measures by methods such as software updates, while also containing
hardware components that are of a high level of security will be important to include in

agricultural machinery for the future. The next chapters will address some possible
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design solutions for agricultural machinery.
3.5.

Conclusions
This objective demonstrates multiple contributions. First, three cyberattack scenarios

were outlined which targeted in-season nitrogen application. Numerous charts
demonstrate what these attacks could look like and the greater financial implications of
these attacks targeting in-season nitrogen application. Other precision agricultural
operations, such as planting, could be targeted with cyberattacks such as the ones
discussed in this chapter, resulting in major financial implications. Second, the specific
financial implications of the cyberattack were discussed. Cyberattacks intending to target
in-season nitrogen application could have financial implications that reach far beyond the
targeted farmer. A cyberattack like this could open the door for a state-sponsored attack,
intended to destabilize a country or global market. Finally, this cyberattack scenario is an
example where the level of significance should drive the degree of security incorporated
into agricultural machinery. The scenario might have relatively minor consequences
across 100-acres, but across multiple farms or larger areas, the cyberattack could result in
major impacts. There is a need for more research to provide practical solutions in
improving the cybersecurity of agricultural machinery.
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Chapter 4: CYBERSECURITY MODELING FOR AGRICULTURAL
MACHINERY
This chapter will present a modeling methodology CASE (Conceptualize, Assemble,
Simulate, Evaluate) for its usefulness as a tool for the design of secure agricultural
machinery while identifying the most security-critical areas of the system under design.
4.1.

Introduction
The rapid advancement of agricultural machinery in both capability and function over

the past few decades, can largely be attributed to the integration of digital technologies to
the machinery. These integrated digital technologies are critical to the future of
agriculture but have introduced many cyberattack vectors and security concerns. For
example, telematics electrical control units (TCUs) have the capability to be accessed
remotely via cellular networks and allow for remote monitoring and even tuning of
electrical control units (ECUs) on tractors (M. Boland et al., 2021). These telematics
units have allowed for improved efficiencies on farming operations, but also provide a
communication vector for cyber-attackers to target. The recent introduction of
autonomous technologies and fully autonomous machinery (Tibken, 2022) has only
increased the urgency for cybersecurity to agricultural machinery, since autonomous
machines will rely on robust communication to operate safely (Gupta et al., 2020).
Although it is possible to add security concepts after a machine is manufactured, the
automotive industry has demonstrated that the inclusion of cybersecurity concepts during
the design process, is the best use of time and resources in producing the most secure
product (“Automotive Cybersecurity by Design,” 2021). Agricultural machinery
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contains comparable complexity in machine control architecture and could benefit from
the same design principles. Therefore, an important question to ask is what tools can be
used to design robust and secure agricultural machinery? Current literature lacks
significant solutions for secure design of agricultural machinery.
Modern agricultural machinery contains an array of complex control subsystems such
as steering/navigation, engine and hydraulic control, implement operation, and
emergency stop systems. Autonomous agricultural machinery will build on the
subsystems of current agricultural machinery by adding more subsystems such as
surrounding awareness and object detection, path planning, and improved communication
systems. It is an understatement that modern agricultural machines are complex. Since
there is a high degree of complexity of agricultural machinery even at the subsystem
level, a tool such as modeling could be useful to design, by trialing various system
configurations before proceeding further in the design process. Since both robust and
secure agricultural machinery is required for the future of agriculture, this chapter will
investigate if modeling could be a useful tool in the design and integration of security
concepts to agricultural machinery.
4.2.

Background
Modeling is a tool that is used for a wide variety of applications in agriculture such as

mechanical machine design, crop yield modeling, crop harvesting logistics planning, and
control system design. Some examples of modeling for agricultural mechanical machine
design are discussed in a literature review paper by (Zhao et al., 2021). Modeling has
also been used to predict crop yields (Oteng-Darko et al., 2012). Harvesting logistics for
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agricultural crops have been modeled, to determine the most time and resource efficient
path for the harvesting machinery (Evans et al., 2020). Finally, modeling has be used to
develop and optimize control systems, such as HVAC systems (Afram and JanabiSharifi, 2015). Modeling for control system design can be based around automata theory
concepts. Automata theory is a theoretical branch of computer science that studies
abstract models called automatons (“Basics of Automata Theory,” n.d.). Automatons are
models of machines that move through various states based on inputs to the model
(Hopcroft et al., 2007). Finite state machines are a category of automaton that work
under a ‘finite’ set of operating states (Rich, 2007). Stateflow is a powerful tool that
leverages the principles of automata theory and finite state machines to build complex
models that can be simulated (“Stateflow - MATLAB & Simulink,” n.d.).
Cybersecurity has also benefited from modeling techniques. Cybersecurity risks are
modeled in a paper by (Peng et al., 2018), that found that modeling multivariant
cybersecurity risks, resulted in a more accurate prediction of the impacts of the attack. A
wholistic and systems approach was taken in the modeling of broader cybersecurity
concepts in a paper by (Yan, 2020). A methodology for using modeling for a
combination of both systems design and cybersecurity analysis will be presented in the
next sections. The methodology will be assessed by means of a case study, which will
leverage Stateflow as a modeling tool, since it provides a user-friendly graphical user
interface to quickly build and simulate models.

4.3.

Research Methodology and Materials
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This section will present a methodology where Stateflow, an automata theory based
modeling software, will be used to design a critical subsystem of an agricultural machine,
while attempting to provide cybersecurity insight to the design process. The critical
subsystem that will be modeled is the emergency stop (E-stop) system of a supervised
autonomous agricultural machine, Flexible Structured Robotic Platform (Flex-Ro).
4.3.1.

Flex-Ro

Flex-Ro, is a 57-horsepower supervised autonomous field platform (Figure 4.1) that
was developed to perform low-draft agricultural operations (Murman, 2019; Werner,
2016). The machine is composed of numerous commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
components such as electronic control units (ECUs), a Kubota Engine, and electric
steering motors. Flex-Ro has four independently driven and steered wheels which provide
optimal flexibility and maneuverability of the platform. A centralized CAN-bus network
(Figure 4.2) is a critical part of Flex-Ro as it allows for numerous ECUs to communicate
and control the various subsystems on the platform. The CAN-bus network on the
machine operates under the SAE J1939 protocol, along with the addition of numerous
proprietary messages. The platform has been used for field scouting and crop data
collection but may be used for additional tasks such as planting and spraying in the
future.
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Figure 4.1: Flex-Ro performing a field scouting operation

Figure 4.2: CAN bus network of Flex-Ro

Flex-Ro, an agricultural machine, contains numerous complex control subsystems. A
hydraulics subsystem supplies power to each wheel motor and the wheel speed is
controlled by an ECU connected to the CAN-bus network on the machine. The steering
and navigation subsystem incorporates multiple steering motors and gearboxes all
controlled by a network of ECUs. The steering commands originate from the Flex-Ro
remote control ECU or connected computer. Steering control inputs are then integrated
with Global Positioning System (GPS) location commands for autonomous navigation.

The engine on Flex-Ro contains a proprietary ECU that operates under the SAE J1939
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protocol. An emergency stop (E-stop) system is another major subsystem that protects
the machine and surroundings from damage. Multiple subsystems will be added to FlexRo in the future as it continues through research development.
The E-stop system is a critical subsystem of Flex-Ro that provides safety to the FlexRo machine and its surroundings. The current E-stop system was built without
integrating cybersecurity, therefore this case study will aim to evaluate the current E-stop
system for areas that are most vulnerable to cyberattacks.

Figure 4.3: E-stop button on a corner of Flex-Ro

4.3.2.

Modeling Methodology

The modeling methodology chosen for this case study is laid out in Table 4.1. The
major steps in this method include 1) conceptualization, 2) model assembly, 3)
simulation, and 4) evaluating the results. Each step includes a series of questions that can
be asked to aid in the development process.

Table 4.1: CASE Modeling Methodology for Agricultural Control Systems
Step 1:
Conceptualize
1. What is the
purpose of the
subsystem
being designed?

Step 2: Assemble

Step 3: Simulate

Step 4: Evaluate

1. How will the
inputs/outputs
be represented
in the modeling
software of
choice?

1. Where does the
model fail?

1. Which
cybersecurity
vulnerabilities
need
redundancies?

2. What is the
priority of the
subsystem?
Low, Medium,
High, Critical?

2. How will the
states be
represented in
the modeling
software of
choice?

2. Does the model
enter any
unintended
states?

2. How can the
subsystem be
made more
efficient?

3. What are the
inputs/outputs
to the
subsystem?

3. What are the
3. Do any of the
transition
modeled
conditions and
cybersecurity
how can they be
vulnerabilities
represented in
cause the model
the modeling
to enter an
software of
unintended
choice?
state?

4. How does the
subsystem
specifically
interact with the
other
subsystems of
the overall
machine?
5. What are the
normal
operating
states?
6. What are
potential attack
states?
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Conceptualization is the first step in this security modeling process. Since
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agricultural machines are complex systems, this method breaks the larger complex
system into subsystems for cybersecurity analysis, design, and modeling. The
conceptualization process considers what role the subsystem plays in the larger machine,
what the priority of the subsystem is, and what the inputs/outputs are to the subsystem.
Determining the normal states and potential cyberattack states should be accomplished
during the conceptualization step.
Assembly the model is the second step in the process. Determining how the inputs
and outputs will be represented in the software of choice is the first step. Other questions
that should be asked include how the states should be represented in the model and how
the states are related. Since this methodology is aiming to identify cybersecurity
vulnerabilities, identifying potential attack states is important. Attack states can
continuously be added to the model over time to analyze what risk they pose to the
overall system. This modeling methodology is an iterative process, therefore moving
between the conceptualization and assembly steps is encouraged.
The value of a model is that it can be run multiple times to evaluate how the
subsystem could operate in order to make improvements. Simulating the model
frequently can provide insight into what features need to be present when the physical
subsystem is built. The third step of simulating the model can help demonstrate where
the subsystem could fail or enter any unintended states.

The final step of this methodology involves evaluating the subsystem and model to
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understand where improvements can be made. This includes evaluating if redundancies
are needed in the subsystem or how the subsystem can be made more efficient.
4.4.

Results and Discussion
This section demonstrates the Stateflow model that was developed using the proposed

modeling methodology.
4.4.1.

Conceptualize

The first step of the proposed modeling methodology is conceptualization. The six
questions proposed during the conceptualization step will be addressed in this section as
it pertains to the Flex-Ro E-stop system. The first question is, what is the primary
function of the subsystem, or E-stop system in this case? As discussed previously, the
Flex-Ro E-stop system is built to provide safety to the machine and its surroundings by
preventing catastrophic damage or injury. The E-stop system will also check to make
sure that all ECUs of critical systems are functioning properly. In the ideal case, the Estop system will safely shut the machine down and bring it to a controlled stop if a
malfunctioning ECU or impending damage is detected. The second question is what is
the priority of the subsystem? In the case of the Flex-Ro E-stop system, the subsystem is
of the highest priority. In the worst-case scenario, all computational resources on FlexRo should be directed to the E-stop system.
Questions three through six (Table 4.1) all share a common theme: interactions with
and within the subsystem. Question three asks, what are the inputs and outputs to the
subsystem? The Flex-Ro E-stop system contains some physical inputs as demonstrated

62
in Figure 4.3. Four physical E-stop buttons provide input signals to the E-stop system if
any of the four corners of Flex-Ro physically come into contact with an obstacle. There
also are digital E-stop button inputs on the Flex-Ro remote (Figure 4.4) and FlexRoRun
app (Figure 4.5) that provide input messages to the E-stop system. Another input to the
E-stop system is a routine heartbeat message from the ECUs that are connected to the Estop system. If an ECU stops providing a heartbeat message, it is assumed to be
functioning improperly and triggers the E-stop system to shut down Flex-Ro. The final
input to the E-stop system on Flex-Ro is the digital reset button from either the Flex-Ro
remote (Figure 4.4) or Flex-Ro run app (Figure 4.5). The reset button is meant to be an
input from an operator to the E-stop system that it is safe to try to restart Flex-Ro. The
reset button is depressed before starting the machine for normal operation or when trying
to restart Flex-Ro after an E-stop trigger event occurs that shuts down the machine. The
primary output from the Flex-Ro E-stop system is a message that negates current
machine operation commands and instead sends a message to stop and shut down the
machine.

Figure 4.4: Flex-Ro remote E-stop and reset button inputs
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Figure 4.5: FlexRoRun app with E-stop and reset buttons highlighted

The fourth question to be asked during the conceptualization process is how the
subsystem should specifically interact with other subsystems on the machine. The three
main subsystems the E-stop subsystem interacts with are the hydraulics, power and
engine, and steering subsystems. Each ECU on Flex-Ro has a section of code that acts as
the E-stop system as demonstrated in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7. The hydraulics
subsystem interacts with the E-stop system by sending a routine heartbeat message to
indicate it is operational. If at any time the hydraulic subsystem becomes inoperable, the
E-stop system will attempt to send a message to shut down the hydraulic valves and
engine on Flex-Ro. The engine and power ECUs interact with the E-stop subsystem in a
similar way the hydraulics subsystem does, by sending routine heartbeat messages. In

the case that the engine ECU stops sending routine heartbeat messages, an E-stop state
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will be triggered and messages will be sent to shut down the engine and hydraulic valves
that control flow to the drive motors. The steering subsystem specifically interacts with
the E-stop subsystem by transmitting the state of the E-stop buttons, positioned on the
four corners of Flex-Ro.

Figure 4.6: Overview of Flex-Ro E-stop system in SAFE state
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Figure 4.7: Overview of Flex-Ro E-stop system in UNSAFE state

The answers to questions five and six relating to the normal and potential attack
states of the E-stop system can be answered in detail by Figure 4.8, Figure 4.9, and the
tables that correspond. To summarize, there are three main states that the E-stop system
could currently enter with the way the E-stop system is currently configured. Potential
cyberattacks could add numerous new states that could be entered by a variety of
transition conditions as demonstrated in Figure 4.9.

66

1
State 1

3
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State 3

State 2
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Figure 4.8: Emergency Stop (E-stop) Finite State Diagram

Table 4.2: Normal states of the Flex-Ro E-stop subsystem as shown in Figure 4.8
States
State 1
State 2
State 3

Description
Currently Checking System – UNSAFE for operation
Currently Checking System – SAFE for operation
E-stop – UNSAFE for operation

Table 4.3: Normal transition conditions as shown in Figure 4.8
Transitions
1
2
3

Description
All ECUs have been checked at least once without any E-stop conditions
At least one ECU has stopped responding or stop condition triggered by Estop button input
E-stop reset input to system
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Figure 4.9: Emergency Stop (E-stop) Finite State Diagram with Attack States

Table 4.4: Potential states under a cyberattack as shown in Figure 4.9
States
State 1
State 2
State 3
State 4
State 5

Description
UNSAFE for operation
SAFE for operation
UNSAFE for operation – E-stop triggered
SAFE for operation – E-stop trigger condition targeted by cyberattack
UNSAFE for operation – E-stop trigger condition targeted by cyberattack

Table 4.5: Transition conditions under a cyberattack as shown in Figure 4.9
Transitions

Description

1

All ECUs have been checked at least once without any E-stop conditions

2

ECU triggered E-stop condition

3

E-stop reset input to system

4
5

At least one ECU is targeted by a cyberattack and returns a false positive
E-stop trigger
At least one ECU is targeted by a cyberattack and returns a false negative
E-stop trigger

4.4.2.

Model Assembly
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It is important to determine which components in the modeling software of choice,
will represent each of the inputs, outputs, states, and transition conditions of the
subsystem being modeled? For this case study, Stateflow components will be used in
modeling the E-stop system of Flex-Ro. The components include state blocks, transition
arrows and conditions, input constants, switches, push buttons, and an output graphical
scope. Table 4.6 shows a generic version of each of these components with a brief
explanation of how they can be used. Figure 4.10 shows the Stateflow model while
Figure 4.11 shows the full Stateflow model including the Matlab interface. Appendix A
presents more details on each of the specific components of the Stateflow model.
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Table 4.6: Useful Stateflow Components
Stateflow Object

Image

Use

Stateflow Chart

Provides an area where state
models can be built to
interact with inputs and
outputs

Stateflow State

Stateflow ‘states’ that can
model finite states

Transition
Condition

Transition condition that
enables a transition from one
state to another

Input Constant

Input values to Stateflow
chart for use in state and
transition condition logic

Slider Switch

Slider switch to manually
control input constants

Push Button

Push button to manually
control input constants

Scope

Scope used to display
outputs from the Stateflow
chart
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Figure 4.10: Fully assembled Stateflow model
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Figure 4.11: Stateflow model within MATLAB interface

4.4.3.

Simulation
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After the first build of the Stateflow model, the Matlab debuggers prevented the
model from running because of undefined variables. After fully defining all the variables
in the model, the model was simulated and observed to see if it accurately represents the
E-stop system. Some transitions between the Display states and E-stop state were
eliminated since they misrepresent how the E-stop system functions and allowed the
model to enter States 2 or 4 (Figure 4.9) before all ECUs were checked. The E-stop
system is currently configured to start back with the first ECU in the sequence after a
reset, therefore the additional transition conditions needed to be eliminated. Stateflow
provides a graphical logger that plots the output data values from the state diagram.
Figure 4.12 shows some basic outputs from the graphical logger, or scope, on some of the
initial runs of the model. The ‘state’ output value demonstrated by the yellow line, plots
which of the five states from Figure 4.9 the model is operating in based on the input
conditions. The out_run_cmds variable provides an output of whether the E-stop system
is allowing for the communication of the input operation commands to the corresponding
ECUs or if an E-stop condition has constituted the system be shut down. For example, an
input command to start the engine would not be allowed to be sent until all ECUs have
been verified to be operating properly and no E-stop trigger event has occurred. The blue
line in Figure 4.12 demonstrates how the out_run_cmds variable is plotted over time and
its relationship to the overall E-stop state.
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Figure 4.12: Running model and output scope

The second step after creating an initial operating model is to evaluate where the most
vulnerable parts of the model exist that could possibly be targeted by a cyberattack. As
conceptualized in Figure 4.9, there could be conditions where a false positive or negative
E-stop trigger is sent because of a cyberattack. One way this could happen is if any of
the ECUs within the E-stop system, experience a cyberattack. To model this possibility,
an additional state was added to the Stateflow model to represent a compromised ECU.
Figure 4.13 demonstrates the attack state that was added to the model to represent a case
where an ECU stopped providing valid E-stop trigger responses.
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Figure 4.13: Stateflow model entering attack state

When in an attack state, the Stateflow model will bypass the normal ECU state
(Disp_chk_RF) and instead read the inputs to the Disp_chk_RF_attacked state. Other
attack conditions could be added to Figure 4.9 and the Stateflow model could include
attacks such as Denial of Service (DoS), where the CAN bus is overloaded with messages
which prevent the E-stop system from functioning.
4.4.4.

Evaluate Model

Evaluating each iteration of the model is important to understanding details that need
to be included while building a physical prototype of the subsystem. Details such as what
specific transition conditions need to exist and what priority each ECU should interact
with the E-stop system were important details that were learned while building and
running the Stateflow model. For example, it is important that each ECU on the E-stop

system is checked in some order or timed sequence to confirm that all ECUs are
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responding properly. There would have to be some leeway given to the expected response
time based on the latency of the CAN bus.
Since the CAN bus contains little to no know encryption methods, ECUs could be
attacked over the CAN bus and pretend to be one of the critical system ECUs, creating
problems as demonstrated in the Stateflow model. Two attack scenarios were
demonstrated in this model to show what a cyberattack to the control system could look
like. The model revealed that some level of security is needed that prevents the CAN bus
from being accessed, otherwise an attacker could easily control the E-stop system or any
operation command for that matter. The Stateflow model that was built in this case study
could easily be built with more complexity, to provide more accurate simulation of the
actual system. Stateflow offers CAN bus simulation blocks to further simulate an actual
CAN bus. The model also demonstrated the capability of adding other features to the Estop system, such as including object detection and avoidance. Using the methodology
proposed in this chapter, these new features could be further developed through the
conceptualization and modeling process.
4.5.

Conclusions
The case study presented in this chapter demonstrated how modeling could be used as

a tool during the design of agricultural machinery. Since agricultural machines are
complex, this modeling methodology demonstrates how the complexity in designing an
entire agricultural machine could be reduced by breaking it into subsystems. The
modeling methodology presents how each subsystem can be designed, while being
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mindful of its interaction with the overall machine. This methodology also provides the
benefit of running through many design scenarios of a potential subsystem before any
physical components are assembled.
The increasing need of cybersecurity for agricultural machinery will require many
tools to be developed to face this rising challenge. Modeling is one method to not only
design subsystems but also think about potential cyberattack scenarios and how they
could be prevented from the beginning of the design process. This case study
demonstrated how Stateflow was used to develop a model of the E-stop system of FlexRo and simulate potential attack scenarios. Although the developed model was unable to
identify cybersecurity vulnerabilities without specifically building the potential
vulnerabilities into the model, this methodology along with future work could be used to
identify and address specific cybersecurity vulnerabilities through more wholistic
analysis.

Chapter 5: UTILIZING TESTBEDS TO ANALYZE
CYBERSECURITY VULNERABILITIES TO AGRICULTURAL
MACHINERY
There is a need for tools and methodologies to identify secure components and
software configurations for agricultural machinery. This chapter will demonstrate how
the use of testbeds could aid in the identification of cybersecurity vulnerabilities and
testing of critical attack vector components on agricultural machinery.

5.1.

Introduction
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New agricultural machinery is constantly being developed to meet the niche needs
and preferences of farmers while solving the current challenges facing agriculture today.
Many agricultural machines and implements are compatible with other OEM makes and
models of machinery, opening the door for a variety of equipment combinations based on
the farmer’s preference and productivity needs. This adds challenge to the design process
of agricultural machinery, as each machine needs to be compatible with a variety of
machines and implements from multiple manufacturers. Standards such as ISO 11783
(ISOBUS) have made this machine compatibility possible (Lenz et al., 2007). One of the
most recent innovations to agricultural machinery is autonomous technologies such as
John Deere’s release of their autonomous 8R tractor in January 2022 (Tibken, 2022).
This tractor is embedded with numerous technologies and even the capability of being
controlled via a cell phone (Tibken, 2022). With the large amounts of integrated digital
technology, large selection of implement/machine combinations, and the numerous
aftermarket components that are added to modern agricultural machinery, cybersecurity
is becoming a concern. Two FBI reports have highlighted the potential significance of
cyberattacks that target agriculture (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2021; “Ransomware
Attacks on Agricultural Cooperatives Potentially Timed to Critical Seasons - HS Today,”
2022) while a report by the Department of Homeland Security has discussed threats to
precision agriculture (Boghossian et al., 2018). This means that the future of agriculture
depends on robust, secure, and highly functional machines.

Agricultural machines are subject to rigorous testing during the design process to
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confirm they will perform as designed. Mechanical, hydraulic, electrical, and software
systems are all typical examples of engineered systems that are tested during the design
process. A tool such as a testbed is one such way that these systems can be tested and
validated for optimal performance. A testbed is simply a segment of a device or machine
that is assembled so controlled tests, such as functionality and durability, can be
performed. Since cybersecurity principles need to be integrated into agricultural
machinery, it is important to develop tools that help with this process. Currently both
industry and academic research has been focusing on this challenge, although there are no
well-known solutions in literature. This chapter will present how testbeds could be a tool
to identify cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the hardware and software systems of
agricultural machinery, along with the identification of the most secure hardware
components.
5.2.

Case Study
This section will present a case study where STAVE, a Security Testbed for

Agricultural Vehicles and Environments, developed during this thesis work, will be used
to demonstrate how security vulnerabilities can be identified and evaluated on
agricultural machinery using testbed solutions.
5.2.1.

STAVE Testbed

The STAVE testbed consists of multiple hardware and software components from a
supervised autonomous agricultural machine, Flex-Ro (Figure 5.1). Flex-Ro can be
controlled by a wireless remote (Figure 5.2) or computer when operating in autonomous
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mode. Since Flex-Ro is a large machine with many expensive components, it was best to
build a testbed to perform cybersecurity tests on rather than Flex-Ro itself, to prevent
potential damage to the machine.

Figure 5.1: Flex-Ro at the Nebraska Tractor Test Lab (NTTL)

Figure 5.2: Flex-Ro Wireless Remote

There are two main parts to STAVE. First, Figure 5.3 presents half of the testbed that
replicates some of the major control components the Flex-Ro machine. Figure 5.4
presents the other major half of STAVE that replicates the Flex-Ro wireless remote
(Figure 5.2). Finally, Figure 5.5 demonstrates how data was acquired from the testbed.
All the major components of STAVE can be seen in Table 5.1 along with a description of
their purpose.
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Figure 5.3: STAVE (Security Testbed for Agricultural Vehicles and Environments) – Composed of
components from the Flex-Ro machine

Figure 5.4: STAVE (Security Testbed for Agricultural Vehicles and Environments) – Composed of
components from Flex-Ro wireless remote
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Figure 5.5: STAVE (Security Testbed for Agricultural Vehicles and Environments) – Data acquisition and
monitoring of STAVE

Table 5.1: STAVE Components
Name
Implement ECU

Part Number
Danfoss MC024-110

Description
ECU that can be programmed to operate
any implement attachments to Flex-Ro

Hydraulics ECU

Danfoss MC024-110

ECU that controls the hydraulic system
of Flex-Ro, including the hydraulic
powered wheel drive motors

Engine ECU

Danfoss MC024-110

ECU that receives engine commands
from the Flex-Ro remote or computer
and converts to specific CAN messages
which are provided to the Kubota Engine

Power ECU

Danfoss MC012-010

Steering ECU

Danfoss MC012-010

ECU that controls the power system on
Flex-Ro and aids in shutting down the
machine under emergency stop
conditions
One of four ECUs on Flex-Ro that
control the four modes of steering and
receive E-stop button inputs from the
four corners of Flex-Ro

Wireless CAN
Bridge

Magnetek WIC-2402

Flex-Ro Remote
Display ECU

Danfoss DP600

Flex-Ro Remote
Joystick

Danfoss JS1000

Raspberry Pi
with CAN shield

3 Model B+
/ PiCAN 2

Wireless CAN bridge that allows for
communication between the Flex-Ro
remote and machine
ECU that enables remote input
commands to control Flex-Ro when not
operating autonomously
Joystick used to steer Flex-Ro when not
operating autonomously
Used to monitor CAN messages and
could be programmed as an additional
ECU

The majority of STAVE is a replica of the Flex-Ro control structure. Some
components were not included from the Flex-Ro machine such as three of the four
steering ECUs, the GPS unit (Trimble AG-372), telematics control unit (Farmobile
PUC4), Kubota Engine ECU, and obstacle detection unit (ifm O3M950/O3M151). A

82

Raspberry Pi (Figure 5.5) was added to be able to monitor the CAN bus or act like an
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additional ECU on Flex-Ro. The benefit of STAVE is that it can be rearranged
depending on the components that are under testing. For the specific arrangement of
components on STAVE as demonstrated in the previous figures, the goal was to assess
the wireless CAN bridge (WIC 2402) for cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
5.2.2.

Testing

Two primary tests were carried out on STAVE with the goals of investigating the
cybersecurity vulnerabilities that exist on Flex-Ro. The first test involved using the
Raspberry Pi to sniff and replay messages on the CAN bus. One of the ECUs (Model:
Danfoss MC024) was reprogrammed via the PLUS+1 GUIDE software, while the
Raspberry pi was used to record the CAN messages on the CAN bus during the
reprogramming event. After the ECU was reprogrammed, the Raspberry Pi was used to
replay the programming messages on the CAN bus. The ECU that was reprogrammed
using the proper PLUS+1 GUIDE software was not able to be reprogrammed by the
replay messages, although the ECU was forced into a boot-loader mode. This
demonstrated that if a device was able to record CAN messages and perform a simple
replay attack, the ECUs on the CAN bus could potentially be forced into an inoperable
mode. Further work could be done with this type of attack to see if any of the ECUs on
STAVE could be reprogrammed with an additional device such as a Raspberry Pi.
The second test that was performed on STAVE was wireless sniffing of the WIC
2402 device to see if any cybersecurity vulnerabilities exist such as a lack of encryption.
A HackRF device (“HackRF One - Great Scott Gadgets,” n.d.) and Universal Radio
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Hacker (URH) software (Pohl and Noack, 2018) were used to ‘sniff’ the wireless traffic
produced by the wireless CAN bridge devices. The wireless CAN bridge (WIC) devices
were determined to operate in the 2.4 GHz frequency, which proved to be very ‘noisy’
(Figure 5.6) or cluttered with other 2.4 GHz signals.

Figure 5.6: Noisy 2.4 GHz frequency range when recording signals from WIC devices in ‘noisy’
environment. Black line signifies current live signals while red line holds the maximum values during the
current run time.

It was decided that to isolate the wireless frequency messages between the WIC 2402
devices, a faraday box or similar device was needed to block out outside interference.
Figure 5.7 demonstrates the setup used to sniff the messages transmitted between the
WIC devices.
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Figure 5.7: Copper radio frequency blocking box used to perform tests on STAVE

Some important findings were discovered while sniffing the traffic. First, the WIC
devices communicated with a frequency hopping pattern, which allows the transmitted
messages to avoid other 2.4GHz messages. Figure 5.8 displays the spectrum analyzer
from inside the copper radio frequency blocking box.

Figure 5.8: Wireless signals between WIC devices captured on URH spectrum analyzer.
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It can be noted that there is a distinct frequency hopping pattern, as multiple equal-spaced
peaks exist. Figure 5.9 demonstrates a sample recording from inside the box with the

Figure 5.9: Sample URH recording with FSK demodulation at 2.419MHz

HackRF device and URH software. The URH software was unable to properly decode
the recorded signals that were transmitted between the WIC devices due to an improper
frequency demodulator. The WICs operate with minimum-shift keying (MSK)
modulation, while the URH software is only able to decode with frequency-shift keying
(FSK), phase-shift keying (FSK), and amplitude-shift keying (ASK) modulation. This
presents an area of future work where a more complete analysis of the WIC device could
be performed to gain a better understanding of any potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities.

The other components on Flex-Ro such as the Farmobile PUC4 could be added to
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STAVE in the future to assess the level of security of such devices.
5.3.

Discussion
Testbeds are tools with a wide range of applications and can be used while

developing agricultural machinery. For developing secure and robust agricultural
machinery, testbeds can be a useful tool during the software and control systems
development cycle. STAVE demonstrates the potential of testbeds for identifying
cybersecurity vulnerabilities to the control systems of agricultural machinery. There are
two main concepts that can be learned from STAVE.
First, testbeds are a great way to segment off sections of a complex machine for
specific, targeted testing. Attempting to perform cybersecurity tests to the full Flex-Ro
machine could be dangerous and challenging, at least for initial tests. STAVE also
demonstrated the flexibility in testing new components that could be added to Flex-Ro.
All the components on STAVE were hardware-based, meaning they had a physical ECU,
rather than a computer simulated ECU and code. Some advantages to this are that the
components react as they would on the actual machine, rather than an idealized ECU in a
simulation. The advantage to virtual ECUs and testbed devices is more flexibility to
which ‘components’ are added to the testbed, while there is no need for the purchase of
additional hardware components.
The second takeaway from building STAVE was that testbeds can be great for testing
multiple hardware and software configurations for cybersecurity vulnerabilities. STAVE
could easily be adapted with new software and hardware components to see if the new

configurations could add more security to Flex-Ro. Professional cybersecurity
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penetration tests could be performed on a testbed like STAVE, by treating it like a ‘black
box’ or ‘grey box’, to identify cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Once these vulnerabilities
are identified, various hardware and software component configurations could be tested
to see which components provide the optimal level of security. As new cybersecurity
vulnerabilities arise or aftermarket components are added, the testbed will be a necessity
to provide security updates to existing machines. Other testbeds could be combined with
a testbed like STAVE, to experiment how agricultural implements that are connected
over an implement bus could interact with the main machine. Since there are multiple
machinery manufacturers with various models and styles of machine control, testing to
make sure that the system under design does not become insecure with the addition of
other equipment would be valuable.
5.4.

Conclusions
Agricultural machinery is getting continuously more complex, with autonomous

machines being the most recent major advancement. These data-driven machines will
depend on more robust communication and control algorithms to reach the highest
potential in the future. Cybersecurity has become a topic of discussion as these
agricultural machines have become more connected, with warnings coming from
agencies such as the FBI and DHS on the possible effects of cyberattacks. Therefore,
there is a need for tools that will help include cybersecurity principles throughout the
entire lifecycle of agricultural machinery, including the design process.

STAVE was presented as one such solution for including cybersecurity during the
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design process of agricultural machinery. Testbeds like STAVE can be used to identify
cybersecurity vulnerabilities to the control systems of agricultural machines and improve
the security of the design, including the selection of more secure components and
software. Testbeds have multiple other advantages to the design process including the
ability to segment off various sections of the machine for more focused testing.
The need for further tools that help improve the cybersecurity of agricultural
machinery is necessary for a successful future. Therefore, this chapter can act as a
starting point for future security solutions and research for agricultural machinery.

Chapter 6: OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
6.1.

Conclusions
Agriculture has embraced many major technological advancements over the past few

centuries, such as genetics, fertilization, and agricultural equipment, with the goal of
responsibly producing enough food and agricultural products to support a growing
population. Some of the more recent advancements include research and technologies
that support precision agricultural management practices. Precision agricultural practices
have demonstrated the potential to be more profitable and sustainable in the production of
agricultural products. Modern agriculture has been reliant on agricultural machinery and
tools to produce agricultural products, where recently these machines have become the
mechanism for implementing precision agricultural practices. The future is likely to see
more adoption of these new equipment technologies including the ones that implement
varying levels of autonomy.
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As with the adoption of any new technology, it is important to consider the potential
drawbacks of adopting a new technology as compared to previous alternatives. Modern
agricultural machinery is and will continue to be reliant on numerous digital technologies
to implement modern agricultural practices. Similar technologies which exist on both
agricultural equipment and within other critical industries have demonstrated the
potential to be subjected to cyberattacks. Quantifying potential cybersecurity risks with
the intent to make better design decisions is an important step for the smart adoption of
these new equipment technologies. Chapter 3 presented a case study that looked at one
potential scenario and outcome of a cyberattack that targeted in-season nitrogen
application to corn. The case study was not attempting to argue against precision
agricultural practices but rather present a method for assessing potential outcomes of
cyberattacks when making cybersecurity design decisions for agricultural machinery.
Overall, thorough cybersecurity risk assessment and a cybersecurity strategy is needed to
protect current and upcoming agricultural machinery from cybersecurity threats.
With the awareness of need for cybersecurity of agricultural machinery, there have
been no well-known publicly available solutions produced by either industry or academic
research to address the challenge of cybersecurity. This thesis presented two potential
solutions: modeling and security testbeds. The CASE modeling method as discussed in
chapter 4, is a way to include cybersecurity principles in the initial design process of a
new machine. Modeling can be a starting point for finding the most secure setup of an
agricultural machine control system. A Stateflow model was built and evaluated to

demonstrate how this type of modeling could be useful in the secure design of
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agricultural machinery.
The second solution that was demonstrated was the use of testbeds for discovering
cybersecurity vulnerabilities and making smart hardware and software selection
decisions. STAVE was presented as an example of how a testbed was used to investigate
the cybersecurity of Flex-Ro. Testbeds provide many benefits and ultimately are a great
way to investigate cybersecurity vulnerabilities without causing damage to the larger
machine.
6.2.

Future Work
There is room for further research into the topic of cybersecurity of agricultural

machinery. The two broad areas for future research to build on this project include
general cyberattack risk assessment and specific cybersecurity solutions for agricultural
machinery. First, a general cyberattack risk assessment would involve identifying
potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities to all areas of agriculture and agricultural
machinery. This could include the assessment of tractors, IoT devices, and digital agtech apps. Another part of this assessment would involve determining potential
cyberattack scenarios and the financial impact they could impose. Further, the
probability of such attacks along with the documented instances of attacks could be used
to determine the financial investment needed to improve cybersecurity within agriculture
and agricultural machinery. The results of this risk assessment process could be provided
to the agricultural community along with education on cybersecurity practices that should
be implemented to protect each individual or company in the agricultural industry.

The second area of future research would include the development of practical
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cybersecurity tools and solutions to improve the cybersecurity of agricultural machinery.
The two solutions of modeling and testbeds, presented in this project, could be areas of
future research. Additional modeling techniques and customized solutions for improving
the design and cybersecurity of agricultural machinery could be developed. Further
development of testbed solutions could provide a practical means for cybersecurity
assessment of prototypes during the design process of agricultural machinery. Other
solutions beyond modeling and testbeds could be developed to improve cybersecurity
practices. The future of agriculture will be dependent on the choices made today to
prepare for the challenges of tomorrow.
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Appendix A: Stateflow Components Used in the E-stop Model
Name

Init

Initialization to
Disp_start
transition

Disp_start

Disp_start to
E-stop
transition

Disp_start to
LF transition

Image

Function

State (1-5)
based on
Figure 4.9

Entry into the model.
Same as turning on
the power supply to
the Flex-Ro machine
and remote.
Transitions from
initialization state to
Disp_start state
when init=1 (init is
just a placeholder
variable to force a
transition from one
state to another).
Enters state 1 in
Figure 4.9.
Initial state of the
Flex-Ro display
ECU. Display ECU
starts by checking
itself for an E-stop
trigger condition.
Transition to E-stop
state if the E-stop
button (disp_button)
on the Flex-Ro
display ECU gets
pressed
Transition to LF
state which signifies
a heartbeat message
being sent to the
left-front steer ECU

1,2,4
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LF

LF to
Disp_chk_LF
transition

Disp_chk_LF

Disp_chk_LF
to E-stop
transition

Disp_chk_LF
to RF
transition

RF

Represents the leftfront steer ECU as it
receives a heartbeat
message from the
display ECU and
input signals from
the attached E-stop
button
Transition
representing
response heartbeat
message being sent
from the left-front
ECU back to the
Display ECU
State where the
display ECU
receives heartbeat
message from LF
and either transitions
to an E-stop state or
continues checking
ECUs
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1,2,4

1,2,4

Transition to E-stop
state if the LF E-stop
button gets pressed
and enter state 3
from Figure 4.9
Transition to RF
state which signifies
a heartbeat message
being sent to the
right-front steer
ECU
Represents the rightfront steer ECU as it
receives a heartbeat
message from the
display ECU and
input signals from
the attached E-stop
button

1,2,4

RF to
Disp_chk_RF_
attacked
transition

Disp_chk_RF_
attacked state

Disp_chk_RF_
attacked to Estop transition

Disp_chk_RF_
attacked to LR
transition

Transition
representing
response heartbeat
message being sent
from the left-front
ECU back to the
Display ECU under
a cyberattack
Represents the
display ECU under a
cyberattack state as
it receives a
heartbeat message
from the right-front
ECU. The display
ECU is still able to
receive and transmit
messages, although
the messages could
be altered.
Transition to E-stop
state if the
Disp_chk_RF_attack
ed interprets that the
RF E-stop button is
pressed. The actual
state of the E-stop
button could be
either pressed or
unpressed.
Transition to state 5
as seen in Figure 4.9
Transition to LR
state which signifies
a heartbeat message
being sent to the
left-rear steer ECU
from the attacked
display ECU
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4

RF to
Disp_chk_RF
transition

Disp_chk_RF

Disp_chk_RF
to E-stop

Transition
representing
response heartbeat
message being sent
from the right-front
ECU back to the
Display ECU
State where the
display ECU
receives heartbeat
message from the
right-front steer
ECU and either
transitions to an Estop state or
continues checking
ECUs
Transition to E-stop
state if the RF Estop button gets
pressed and enter
state 3 from Figure
4.9

Disp_chk_RF
to LR
transition

Transition to LR
state which signifies
a heartbeat message
being sent to the
left-rear steer ECU

LR

Represents the leftrear steer ECU as it
receives a heartbeat
message from the
display ECU and
input signals from
the attached E-stop
button

LR to
Disp_chk_LR

Transition
representing
response heartbeat
message being sent
from the left-rear
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1,2,4

1,2,4
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ECU back to the
Display ECU

Disp_chk_LR

Disp_chk_LR
to E-stop
transition

Disp_chk_LR
to RR
transition

RR

RR to
Disp_chk_RR
transition

State where the
display ECU
receives heartbeat
message from the
left-rear steer ECU
and either transitions
to an E-stop state or
continues checking
ECUs
Transition to E-stop
state if the LR Estop button gets
pressed and enter
state 3 from Figure
4.9

1,2,4

Transition to RR
state which signifies
a heartbeat message
being sent to the
right-rear steer ECU
Represents the rightrear steer ECU as it
receives a heartbeat
message from the
display ECU and
input signals from
the attached E-stop
button
Transition
representing
response heartbeat
message being sent
from the right-rear
ECU back to the
Display ECU

1,2,4

Disp_chk_RR

Disp_chk_RR
to E-stop
transition

Disp_chk_RR
to Pwr
transition

Pwr

Pwr to
Disp_chk_Pwr
transition

Disp_chk_Pwr

State where the
display ECU
receives heartbeat
message from the
right-rear steer ECU
and either transitions
to an E-stop state or
continues checking
ECUs
Transition to E-stop
state if the RR Estop button gets
pressed and enter
state 3 from Figure
4.9
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1,2,4

Transition to Pwr
state which signifies
a heartbeat message
being sent to the
power ECU
Represents the
power control ECU
as it receives a
heartbeat message
from the display
ECU
Transition
representing
response heartbeat
message being sent
from the Pwr ECU
back to the Display
ECU
State where the
display ECU
receives heartbeat
message from the
Pwr ECU and
continues checking
ECUs. Diagram not
currently set up to
represent Pwr,

1,2,4

1,2,4
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Hydro, and Eng
response time
requirements.

Disp_chk_Pwr
to Hydro
transition

Hydro

Hydro to
Disp_chk_Hyd
ro transition

Disp_chk_Hyd
ro

Disp_chk_Hyd
ro to Eng
transition

Transition to Hydro
state which signifies
a heartbeat message
being sent to the
hydraulics control
ECU
Represents the
hydraulics control
ECU as it receives a
heartbeat message
from the display
ECU
Transition
representing
response heartbeat
message being sent
from the Hydro ECU
back to the Display
ECU
State where the
display ECU
receives heartbeat
message from the
hydraulics control
ECU and continues
checking ECUs.
Transition to Eng
state which signifies
a heartbeat message
being sent to the
engine control ECU

1,2,4

1,2,4

Eng

Eng to
Disp_chk_Eng
transition

Disp_chk_Eng

Disp_chk_Eng
to Disp_start
transition

Represents the
engine control ECU
as it receives a
heartbeat message
from the display
ECU
Transition
representing
response heartbeat
message being sent
from the Eng ECU
back to the Display
ECU
State where the
display ECU
receives heartbeat
message from the
engine control ECU
and continues
checking ECUs.
This is the final state
of the ECU check
sequence.
Represents a
transition back to the
start of the ECU
check sequence.
Enters state 2 if all
ECUs were checked
without an E-stop
trigger condition and
no cyberattack is
occurring. Enter
state 4 if no E-stop
trigger conditions
occurred although at
least one ECU is
under cyberattack.
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1,2,4

2,4
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E-stop

Represents E-stop
state where at least
one ECU has
determined an Estop trigger
condition. Normal
control commands
are stopped under
this state and
stop/shutdown
commands are sent
instead.

E-stop to
Disp_start
transition

Transition from Estop state back to
state 1 where all
ECUs are being
checked for E-stop
trigger conditions.
Only happens after a
reset button input is
sent

disp_button

Represents the
display ECU E-stop
button on the FlexRo remote

3,5
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LF_button

Represents the leftfront E-stop button
on Flex-Ro

LR_button

Represents the leftrear E-stop button on
Flex-Ro

RF_button

Represents the rightfront E-stop button
on Flex-Ro

RR_button

Represents the rightrear E-stop button on
Flex-Ro

in_run_cmds

Represents any other
commands sent from
Flex-Ro remote to
run or control FlexRo

attack_RF

Represents rightfront E-stop button
input under a
cyberattack scenario.
Could be different
from actual rightfront button input

117

attack

Input that represents
whether a
cyberattack is/has
occurred or not

reset

Represents reset
button input from
Flex-Ro remote or
FlexRoRun app

state

out_run_cmds

Output from
Stateflow model that
can be used to plot
which ‘state’ from
Figure 4.9 the model
is in over time.
Output that
represents whether
the E-stop system is
allowing normal
operation commands
or is sending E-stop
commands to
stop/shutdown
machine.

